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Abstract: In this paper we look at the position of social renting in Flanders after the GFC. It is argued that the 
GFC has hardly affected the production levels of social rental dwellings. On the contrary levels remain higher 
than before the GFC. Starting from that, we briefly illustrate what the current debates in social rental housing 
are. 
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1 Title of an LP by the British rock band Supertramp (1975, A&M records). 
2 We would like to thank Bjorn Mallants, manager of the VVH, the trade union of the social housing companies 
in Flanders for his contribution. We also thank Caroline Newton for the language editing. 
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Crisis? What crisis? 
 
Since 2008, the number of units in the social rental sector in Flanders has risen from 139,392 
to 150,903 at the end of 20153, an 8% increase. Not what should be expected in times of 
austerity. Throughout this article, we will argue firstly, that the Global Financial Crisis [GFC] 
did not lead to a withdrawal of investments in social rental housing in Flanders, the northern 
part of Belgium. On the contrary, the year following Lehman Brothers’ downturn (2008), the 
Flemish government launched a long-term investment programme to strengthen social housing 
in general and social rental housing in particular. Secondly, we will briefly show that the GFC 
in fact did not change much in Flanders. Policy debates and (to some extent) decisions related 
to social rental housing from before the GFC remained dominant. In short, the GFC was only a 
ripple in the water for social rental housing in Flanders. 
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the first section, we will briefly discuss 
the position of social rental housing on the Flemish housing market. We will then address the 
substantial effects of the GFC in Belgium. The third section will outline the background of the 
aforementioned Flemish investment programme. The final section will discuss the issues the 
social housing sector is dealing with. The housing sector already faced similar challenges prior 
to the GFC, they were to remain serious issues afterwards as well.  
 
 
The position of social rental housing on the Flemish housing 
market 
 
Home ownership rules 
 
It seems pretty odd to find a Western European government investing in social rental housing 
just after a housing crisis resulted in a GFC, which in turn created an economic and 
consequently budgetary crisis in numerous countries. It is even more surprising that it happened 
in a region where social rental housing was never popular. Since the end of the 19th century, 
Belgium – and Flanders to an even larger extent – gradually witnessed the emergence of a home 
ownership regime with a limited regulation of the private rental sector and a marginal social 
rental sector. 
 
Debates on what kind of housing “policy” Belgium should have, date back to the mid-19th 
century. To counter the multiple consequences of the twin development of industrialisation-
urbanisation, important voices pleaded for homeownership as the way to go. Pushing workers 
into homeownership, would have kept them calm and would have avoided social unrest (Smets, 
1977). Very quickly more collective solutions were set aside. The idea that Belgians preferred 
to build their own house – still dominant in current discourses – was already apparent during 
an international conference on cheap dwellings in Düsseldorf in 19024 (Smets, 1977). 
                                                          
3 Sources: VMSW (umbrella organisation of social housing companies) and Vrind2009 (Flemish regional 
indicators 2009). 
4 “… the fact [is] that the Belgian worker prefers to build his own house, on a parcel of his own choice and 
according to his own ideas. For that, he chooses to collect enough savings in order to negotiate with the lenders, 
preferring that above an already built dwelling” (in Smets, 1977: 51, own translation). 
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Mougenot (1988), who studied the period just after the housing law of 1889, concludes that 
social rental housing was ascribed to “an inferior status, where limited rights were associated 
with the social and moral unworthiness of the inhabitants” (Mougenot, 1988: 546). 
 
Bluntly put, we can say that this attitude has not fundamentally changed ever since, two critical 
moments can better illustrate it. In the context of the reconstruction, just after World War 2, a 
heavy debate on the future of housing policies was settled by a socialist housing representative 
and Minister who agreed that home ownership was the solution for the existing housing needs 
and that, consequently, social rental housing was only “additional” (Goossens, 1982). Fifty 
years later, a chairman of the socialist party reaffirmed that social renting was a “side issue.” 
Having as many homeowners as possible, he argued, is the aim of the Flemish region because 
it is the best way to safeguard the pension system (e.g. Stevaert in Desmet, 2003). 
 
 
On the field 
 
The marginal position of social rental housing in debates is reflected in the numbers. Although 
the amount of social rental dwellings has risen (Figure 1 & 2), it has never exceeded 6% of the 
entire housing stock (with higher shares in urban areas). Until 1961 no eligibility criteria were 
used to allocate dwellings. One only needed an official assessment of good behaviour and 
conduct, and a personal contact in the system, preferably a politician. Even when allocation 
criteria were introduced, favouritism dominated allocations until the early 1990s5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 A never published survey carried out in the early 1990s revealed, in the words of the then housing minister De 
Batselier, that only 1/3 of the social housing companies followed the rules, 1/3 could not be controlled and 1/3 did 
not contemplate the rules; from an interview of the minister with the magazine Knack (De Stoop, 1993 – see also 
Hellinck, 2010). 
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Figure 1: Flanders, number of allowed social rental dwellings, 1924-2015 
 
 
Source: VMSW. 
 
Figure 2: Flanders, number of allowed social rental dwellings, 2007-2015 
 
 
Source: VMSW. 
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For a long time, the sector functioned marginally without many problems. This was due to the 
combination of two elements. Firstly, social housing companies had long-term loans for 66 
years, a method that was abolished in the early 1990s. Secondly, the profiles of the renters were 
very diverse. In simple terms, every low-income tenant was compensated with a higher income 
tenant. Hence, financial viability and social liveability were not questioned at the time. This 
changed during the 1980s.  Against the background of the former economic and budgetary 
crisis, an increasing number of low-income tenants, often with migratory origins, entered the 
sector. It also became gradually more difficult to attract higher income households, as access to 
homeownership became attainable for a large majority of the population. Only those who could 
not afford to buy a house were the candidates for social renting. This evolution was enforced 
by a tighter allocation system to eradicate favouritism, introduced in 1994. 
 
As in other countries, most new renters were low-income households (Pannecoucke et al., 
2001). This had severe consequences for the financial viability of social housing companies. At 
the same time, an extreme right political party (Vlaams Blok) started to blame the social rental 
sector for allocating houses only to ‘foreigners’, thus leaving Flemish people behind. So, the 
combination of (1) the consecutive financial difficulties, (2) the influx of low-income renters 
and (3) the detraction of the sector by extreme right politicians, led to a vicious circle that would 
mine the sector. Comments were pervaded by xenophobia and racism. Every (even small) 
accident was exaggerated and often strengthened by the discourses of chairpersons or managers 
of social housing companies6 (De Decker & Pannecoucke, 2004). As a consequence the social 
rental sector became even more unwanted at a local level. However, at different moments in 
time, and urged by the long waiting list, representatives in parliament did make a plea for more 
social rental housing. 
 
In short, at the beginning of the GFC in 2008, the social rental sector was an unwanted stepchild, 
a sector in financial trouble, had a bad reputation, and received little support. 
 
 
Belgium, the GFC and a boring mortgage market 
 
Like many other countries, Belgium was hit by the Global Financial Crisis. The national 
government had to save different banks and insurance companies, either by selling its own 
shares (Fortis7 was sold to PNB Paribas) or by a nationalisation process together with the 
creation of bad banks (Dexia; KBC; Ethias). This had and still has severe consequences on 
public debts which raised dramatically to levels over 100% of the GNP. As a consequence, 
politics of austerity were imposed that have lasted until today. 
However, the GFC hardly had any effects on the housing market or on the housing policies, in 
contrast to countries such as the US, Spain or the Netherlands where households experienced 
house loss or negative equity. Two mechanisms can explain why this happened. 
 
Firstly, both mortgage legislation and house lending practices are rather conservative in 
Belgium. For homeowners, their house is a home, not something “to play” with for money (De 
                                                          
6 Dirtying their own nest would stop when the trade union of the social housing companies (VVH) was 
professionalised. This process occurred during the second half of the 2000s. 
7 Fortis was the successor of the savings and loans bank ASLK that historically financed social housing and social 
loans. The bank was and its successor is still, the market leader in mortgages. 
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Decker, 2013). As a consequence, no “exotic mortgages” were introduced in the market in 
Belgium, not even by banks that were also active in the Netherlands (e.g. Fortis). Households 
were not seduced into taking risks. In addition, the large majority of the mortgages stayed at a 
fixed interest rate. That’s why volatility related to interest rates or housing prices, did not take 
place. This, however, does not mean that the big Belgian banks did not play the global game. 
They did, but not in their home country. As a matter of fact they invested in American subprime 
mortgages or in debts of countries with low financial credibility (e.g. Greece). Consequently, 
when the financial crisis slammed, the Belgian banks got severely affected and the State had to 
save them. 
 
Secondly, the organization of the Belgian state is important. Belgium is a federal state. The 
major housing responsibilities – including the social housing sector – have been delegated to 
the regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels Capital Region). What is essential here is to 
understand how the regions – the ones in charge of housing policies – are financed. At the 
moment of the GFC, the Financing Act stated the rules. The Act guarantees that part of the 
taxes (collected at the Federal level) are to be transferred to the regions 
(Financieringswet/Financing law, 1989). This transfer was fixed for a longer period and would 
not change until the 6th restructuring of the state8 when the state was once more reformed. The 
budgetary problems of the Federal state caused by the GFC had hardly any effect on the regional 
governments that are responsible for housing policies. 
 
To conclude, although major Belgium banks were severely hit by the GFC, it had no immediate 
effect on housing investments by the government, as we will explain in the following part. 
 
 
The 2009 investment programme in social housing 
 
The law (decree) that approved the investment programme for social rental housing was issued 
on 15 May 2009, during the heydays of the GFC. Given the fact that the budgetary downturn 
due to the rescue of the banks by the Federal government had not (yet) trickled down to the 
regions, the law-making process was continued and finalized. To please all coalition partners – 
the Christian Democrats (CD&V), the socialists (sp.a), and the liberals (Open VLD) – the 
legislation was turned into a highly complex set of rules. It not only introduced new tools, but 
also stipulated that 45,000 social rental dwellings were to be constructed. At odds with the usual 
policies, money was guaranteed for a longer period (Figures 2 & 3), a timing (2020) was set, 
and several territorial principles9 were formulated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Agreed upon in December 2011, applied in 2 stages (2012; 2014). 
9 Municipalities that featured fewer shares of social rental housing had to meet higher standards. 
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Figure 3: Planned investment volumes for social rental housing, 2016-2025 
 
 
Source: Belgisch Staatsblad, 24.10.2016. 
 
It was argued that an intervention on the land and building market was legitimate and needed 
whenever private actors were not in the condition to achieve public goals or when vulnerable 
groups had to be offered equal chances to partake. The legislator referred to the following facts: 
 
(1) Only 6% (approximately) of the housing stock was for social rental housing (143,266 
dwellings); 
(2) 317.500 households were, given the eligibility criteria, entitled for social housing; 
(3) 75.000 households were on the waiting list; 
(4) 55.000 households were in urgent housing need; 
(5) waiting times were long10.  
 
In addition, it was acknowledged that an unchanged housing policy would never fill up the gap. 
According to the Flemish government, this justified a “catch up.” The construction level of 
social rental housing did increase, but at a slower pace11 than planned (Figure 2). Several issues 
were in play, including (1) the (limited) capacity of the building sector, (2) the (un)willingness 
of (some) local authorities to allow social rentals on their territory, and (3) legal disputes linked 
to the commitments of the private sector. When the effects of the GFC appeared, they amplified 
the mentioned issues and the speed of the production process dwindled even more. This 
happened after a new state reform, due to which more responsibilities were transferred to the 
regions, and a new Financing Act was put into place. As a subtle budget cut, only 90% of the 
corresponding budgets were transferred, forcing the regional governments to make choices. As 
per the building of social rental dwellings, two major decisions were made at the Flemish level: 
(1) the investment budget had a 15% decrease and (2) the target (the “catch up”) was postponed 
                                                          
10 A household or person who was assigned to a dwelling in 2005, had waited for 872 days on average. 
11 First postponed to 2023, recently to 2025. 
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to 2025. However, this cannot be interpreted as a deliberate choice against social rental housing, 
since - following a budgetary godsend - more money would be invested again in 2017. 
 
Two other ‘very political’ elements would be used to legitimize the investment plan and can be 
seen as immediate triggers: on one hand the public perception that homeownership had become 
less affordable, and on the other hand the on-going debates to enter the waiting lists from 
different sectors. Firstly, the perception had risen that it had become more difficult for the 
middle classes (“our children”) to construct or purchase a home on their own. Although this 
perception was false due to a misinterpretation of the fast increasing housing prices (Winters et 
al., 2015), it nevertheless had become the dominant discourse in media and politics. Given the 
utmost importance of homeownership in Flanders, not to be underestimated, the political world 
looked for solutions that could stop the increase of housing prices. The enlargement of the stock 
seemed a straightforward possibility. However, at the same time the shortage of affordable 
housing was too significant to be ignored. Thus a ‘comprehensive’ plan was developed. As a 
result, the investment programme for social rental housing was bound to an investment plan. A 
supply of cheap plots of land together with the introduction of a new kind of social housing was 
to fulfil the need. This new social housing model, the “modest” dwelling, targeted those who 
had just failed the eligibility criteria for social rent. 
 
Secondly, debates to enter the waiting lists from different sectors were on-going.  Not only 
social rental housing is characterised by long waiting lists, so is care for people with disabilities, 
elderly care or care for psychiatric patients. Since numerous vulnerable people are the victims 
of waiting times, “waiting lists” became an issue on the media and were central topics in 
political debates. Over and over again, the government and the single politicians were 
questioned on why the lists were never shorter. As a consequence, the “waiting lists” - 
according to a former Minister12 an excellent tool for lobbying - became a dominant theme 
during the 2004 elections. 
 
In conclusion, the investment plan – and the decree that enforced it – to strengthen the social 
rental sector tried to address the middle class issue of affordable houses as well as the length of 
waiting lists for social rental housing. 
 
 
Current issues in the social rental sector 
 
Although social dwellings are now built at a greater pace than before, the waiting list keeps on 
getting longer. Thus, after the GFC, (the policies regarding) the social rental housing sector was 
(were) mostly concerned with managing the lack of housing, or in other words with managing 
the waiting list. This concern has been going hand in hand with the attempt to solve the 
historical concern of “problematic tenants13.” Hence, governments, together with the social 
                                                          
12 Former Flemish (Welfare) and federal (Work) Minister I. Vervotte, in Zeno, weekend section of the journal De 
Morgen,  21 January 2017 (Eeckhout & Muylaert, 2017). 
13 The basic regulation regarding new tenants is stipulated by a governmental decision taken in 2006, as the 
implementation of the 1997 Housing Law. However, these rules have repeatedly changed, due to the ongoing 
pressure and lobbying to prioritise new target groups, e.g. homeless, youngsters leaving youth care or former 
psychiatric patients. The incremental way of working has resulted in a very complex set of rules. At the moment 
of writing the policy is under evaluation.  
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rental sector itself, have tried to address two questions: (1) how to shorten the waiting list (and 
time – Figure 4) and (2) how to avoid problematic tenants from entering a social dwelling. 
 
Figure 4: Flanders, waiting lists & new applicants for social housing, 2011-2015 
 
 
Source: Huurpunt. 
 
Regardless of its composition, successive governments have argued that the marginalisation of 
the social rental sector, due to the one-sided access of problematic tenants and tenants with 
migratory backgrounds, had to be tackled by keeping or making social rented housing more 
socially mixed. Therefore at different moments in time income ceilings were lifted14. 
 
Basically, the combination of both goals is a Catch 22. The idea of a social mix on the one 
hand, and the attempt of shortening the waiting list on the other are incompatible, as the former 
leads to a longer waiting list15. That is why, in order to limit the influx of potential “troubling” 
tenants and to increase the general outflow, the 2006 regulation was changed on several 
occasions. These changes were often incidental reactions or responses to parliamentary 
questions (see e.g. De Decker & Pannecoucke, 2004). The main changes required to achieve 
the said twofold goal are the following: 
 
                                                          
14 In the marginalisation process, another reason is ignored.  Since homeownership is affordable, households 
become homeowners as soon as possible, which leaves only no-choice tenants for social housing (De Decker & 
Pannecoucke, 2002). 
15 The latest change in the regulation enlarged the group of potential candidate renters with 100,000 households.  
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1. If social landlords make up a liveability plan for a so-called problematic neighbourhood, a 
certain percentage of the dwellings can be allocated to households with an income that 
exceeds eligibility criteria;  
2. The so-called Article 22 was introduced and allows social landlords to refuse certain 
candidates, e.g. (a) after a negative evaluation by another social landlord, (b) when it is 
proven that a tenant has not fulfilled his/her duties, i.e. a tenant that has not yet paid what 
due at another social housing company can be refused. Or (c) in exceptional cases, when a 
candidate has committed severe offenses and it is believed that the tenant’s behaviour would 
threaten the liveability of the estate, then the tenant can also be excluded.  
3. In order to avoid (too many) “unwanted” candidates, priority rules for specific target groups 
(e.g. homeless, youngster leaving youth care) change constantly. Both the procedures to 
reach a prioritised spot on the waiting list and the share of dwellings to be allocated to 
prioritised groups change regularly. Currently, only 5% of the social rental stock has to be 
assigned to all priority groups, like the homeless and people leaving an institution.  
4. Another way to “manage” the waiting lists is to confer discretionary power to municipalities 
to create local allocation rules. It is officially argued that local authorities know the situation 
in the field. However, in reality, this mechanism hinders potential “problematic tenants” 
from other municipalities to enter. If municipalities refine the allocation rules, two key 
criteria are used: (1) priority is given to candidates who have already lived for a certain 
period in the municipality, and (2) priority is given to the elderly. 
 
The aforementioned strategies were not seen as “successful.” Therefore, the Housing Law was 
changed in 2016 and the principle of lifelong contracts was abandoned. New contracts have a 
9 year validity, and residents can stay only after an assessment of the income. The argument 
relies on the fact that social rental housing should serve those in need and that, therefore, social 
mobile tenants should move out to become either private tenants or a homeowners. 
 
 
To conclude 
 
The present article started with the assumption that the GFC affected housing policies because 
it forced governments to develop an austerity policy. As in many other countries, Belgium was 
hit by the crisis. The federal government had to rescue banks and insurance companies which 
led to an austerity policy that is still felt nowadays. Nevertheless, the newly introduced austerity 
policies cannot be considered a master plan. According to Kickert (2012) Belgium was an 
extreme example of an incremental decision making process. In other words, there were no big 
gestures, but small inconspicuously effective deeds. 
 
Although the GFC has had serious consequences for the Belgian state, it has hardly affected 
social rental housing policies. On the contrary, since the end of the 2000s we have seen an 
ongoing commitment by the Flemish government to invest in social rental housing. These 
investments can be understood as attempts to deal with the ever growing waiting list and the 
influx of potentially problematic tenants. 
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